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38 GLOBE & RUTGERS INS. CO. v. AIRBORNE FLOWER [49 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 24521. In Bank. Aug. 30, 1957.] 
GLOBE AND RU'fGEHS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
(a Corporation), Respondent, v. AIRBORNE FLOWER 
AND FREIGHT TRAFFIC, INC. (a Corporation), Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Carriers-Properly-Connecting Carriers-Rates and Tariifs: 
Liability of Initial Carrier.-In order for an air freight for-
warder to bring itself within the terms of an intrastate tariff, 
incorporated in an airbill by reference, providing that such 
tariff shall inure to the benefit of any person performing de-
livery or ground service in connection with an air freight 
shipment, the forwarder must show that it performed the 
delivery service for an air carrier, and in the absence of a 
stipulation to the contrary such carrier's liability to the shipper 
ceases on delivery of the shipment to the forwarder. (Civ. 
Code, § 2201.) 
[2] Id.-Property-Conneeting Carriers-Relation to Initial Car-
rier.-A finding that an air freight forwarder receiving an 
intrastate air shipment from one city to another at the latter's 
airport handled such shipment" as a carrier for hire on its 
own account as an independent contractor, not as agent of the 
initial carrier, was sustained by evidence that it was employed 
to obtain a result, .namely, delivery of the shipment to the 
consignee's store, that no control was retained or exercised 
over the means by which it performed its task, that it was 
free to choose the route, driver, type of vehicle and manner of 
delivery, and that it used its own driver and equipment in 
making the delivery. 
[3] Id.-Properly-Connecting Carriers-Relation to Shipper.-An 
instruction "PIs. A.M. delivery" indorsed on an airbill by the 
shipper is insufficient to make an air freight forwarder the 
shipper's agent. 
[4] Id.-Properly-Delivery-Obligation of Carrier to Deliver.-
A finding that a contract of carriage between a shipper and 
an air carrier did not require the carrier to deliver an intra-
state air shipment to its destination in the city to which the 
shipment was flown was sustained by evidence that the car-
rier's tariff did not provide for delivery by it of goods carried 
on intrastate flights, that the shipment was accepted by the 
carrier subject to such tariff, that the airbill showed a charge 
by the carner for air transportation only, no charge being 
[1J See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 121 et seq. j Am.Jur., Carriers, 
§ 862 et seq. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1-3, 5 J Carriers, § 51 j [4] Carriers, § 46. 
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made for ground delivery, that on arrival of the shipment at 
the airport of the city to which the goods were flown an air 
freight forwarder received the shipment, weighed it and de-
termined the applicable rate for its transportation to its 
destination within the city, and that the shipper paid the 
carrier for transportation of the goods to the airport and paid 
the forwarder a separate charge for its services. 
[5] Id.-Property-Connecting Carriers-Limitation of Liability. 
-Where an intrastate air shipment of cartons of furs from 
one city to another was received by an air freight forwarder 
at the airport of the city to which the goods were flown, which 
forwarder gave the air carrier a receipt for the goods, and 
where, some time after receipt of such goods by the forwarder 
but before delivery to the consignee's store one carton contain-
ing furs worth $11,755 was lost by or stolen from the for-
warder, its liability was not limited to the declared value of 
the goods as $50 on the air bill, since the forwarder's freight 
charges were computed by reference to weight alone and the 
undervaluation of the furs as declared by the shipper could 
not have affected that rate. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Burnett Wolfson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for loss of a carton of furs. Judgment 
for plaintllr affirmed. 
Wallace, Garrison, Norton & Ray and Maynard Garrison 
for Appellant. 
Joseph F. Rank and Russell K. Lambeau for Respondent. 
SHENK, J .-This is an appeal from a judgment for the 
plaintiff for damages in the sum of $11,755 for the loss of 
a carton of furs. The sole question is whether the judgment 
should be reduced to $50 as specified in an airbill contract 
of cartage. 
United Air Lines is an air carrier engaged in the trans-
portation for hire of passengers and freight in interstate and 
intrastate commerce. Its contract cartage agent makes ground 
delivery of freight carried on interstate flights. It has no 
tariff on file with the California Public Utilities Commission 
governing ground delivery of freight carried on its intra-
state flights. Delivery of goods carried on those flights is accom-
plished by trucking concerns independent of United. 
The defendant, Airborne Flower and Freight Traffic. is an 
air freight forwarder. As an adjunct to its forwarding 
) 
) 
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business it performs trucking services for air carriers which 
operate from the San Francisco Air Terminal. 
In June 1953 Saks Fifth Avenue delivered 10 cartons of 
furs to United Air Lines at the Los Angeles airport for ship-
ment by United to the San Francisco airport. The goods were 
consigned to Saks' San Francisco Store. Saks declared the 
value of the goods to be $50 and an airbill was issued so stat-
ing. The airbill recited that the shipment consisted of ten car-
tons of furs weighing 269 pounds, designated Saks' San Fran-
cisco store as the consignee and requested morning delivery. 
No delivery charges were stated on the airbiU. Under the ap-
plicable tariff, Saks' declaration limited United's liability for 
loss or damage to $50. The actual value of the shipment was 
greatly in excess of its declared value, but it was undervalued 
for the apparent purpose of securing a lower rate from United 
whose charges are based in part upon the declared value of 
the shipment. 
When .the furs arrived at the San Francisco airport, they 
were received by the defendant which gave United a receipt 
for 10 cartons of furs. As stated by Airborne's claims agent 
Airborne solicits trucking business from air carriers which 
operate from the San Francisco airport and it also furnishes 
delivery service to air carriers at their request. It cannot be 
determined from the record which of these procedures was 
followed in the procurement of the shipment here involved. 
Some time after receipt by the defendant, but before de-
livery to Saks' San Francisco store, one carton containing 
furs worth $11,755 was lost by or stolen from the defendant. 
The plaintiff sues by right of subrogation under its policy 
of insurance with Saks. 
The facts are undisputed as is the defendant's liability. 
The controversy relates to the amount of the liability. The 
defendant contends that its liability is limited by Saks' declara-
tion of value and United's tariff which, had the furs been lost 
by United, would have limited United's liability to $50. 
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant is liable for the actual 
value of the furs. 
The airbilI which was signed by Saks' agent at the Los 
Angeles airport recites: "It is mutually agreed that the goods 
herein described are accepted in apparent good order ... 
for transportation as specified herein, subject to governing 
classifications and tariffs in effect as of the date hereof which 
are filed in accordance with law. Said classifications and 
tariffs, copies of which are available for inspection by the 
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parties hereto, are hereby incorporated into and made a part 
of this contract." 
Rule 3.3 of the intrastate tariff filed by United Air Lines 
with the California Public Utilities Commission provides: 
"Except as provided in Rule 3.2 the carrier's liability shall 
in no event exceed the declared value of the shipment. . . ." 
Rule 3.l(b) of the same intrastate tariff provides: "The 
Airbill, or other shipping document, and the tariffs applicable 
to the shipment shall inure to the benefit of and be binding 
upon the consignor and consignee and the carriers by whom 
transportation is undertaken between the origin and destina-
tion, including destination on reconsignment or return of the 
shipment; and shall inure also to the benefit of any other per-
son, firm or corporation performing for the carrier pick-up, 
delivery, or other ground service in connection with the ship-
ment." 
[1] To bring itself within the terms of the tariff, the de-
fendant must show that it performed the delivery service for 
United. United's route ended at the San Francisco terminal, 
and upon its delivery of the shipment to Airborne, United's 
liability to Saks was terminated. 1 
[2] The trial court found that Airborne ". • . was not 
handling said shipment as an agent of United Air Lines or 
on behalf of United Air Lines in any other capacity, but ... 
was handling said shipment as a carrier for hire on its own 
account as an independent contractor and carrier." 
The record does not disclose how Airborne procured the 
shipment from United. Airborne may have solicited the ship-
ment or it may have been summoned by United and requested 
by it to make the delivery. Although the evidence was not 
developed on this point it is sufficient to support the finding 
of the trial court that Airborne acted as an independent 
contractor and not as an agent of United. It was employed 
to obtain a result-the delivery of the shipment to Saks' San 
Francisco store. No control was retained or exercised over 
the means by which it performed that task. It was free to 
choose the route, driver, type of vehicle and manner of de-
livery, and it used its own driver and equipment in making 
the delivery. This case is to be distinguished from Twentieth 
'California Civil Code, section 2201. "If a eo=on carrier accepts 
f.reight for a place beyond his usual route, he must, unless he stipUlates 
otherwise, deliver it at the end of his route in that direction to some 
other competent carrier carrying to the place of address, or connected 
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Oentury Delivery Service, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
00.,242 F.2d 292 relied upon by the defendant. In that case, 
a subrogated insurer of a shipper sought to recover against a 
connecting carrier the sum paid to the shipper for damage 
by the connecting carrier to a coffee vending machine. The 
shipment was carried subject to an airbill of lading which 
incorporated the air carrier's tariffs. The applicable tariff 
provided, as in the present case, that it should inure to the 
benefit of any person performing delivery service for the air 
carrier. The airbill execnted between the shipper and the 
air carrier included charges for the delivery of the shipment 
and the tariff was construed to include the defendant within 
its coverage. It was held that the limitation of liability con· 
tained in the tariff inured to the benefit of the connecting 
carrier and the plaintiff's recovery was thus limited to the 
declared value of the shipment. 
The defendant contends that it acted as an agent of Saks 
and as such is entitled to the limitation of liability. There 
is no evidence relating to the arrangements between United 
and Saks at the time of the shipment from the Los Angeles 
airport or between United and the defendant at the San 
Francisco airport. [3] The instructions "PIs. A. M. de· 
livery" indorsed on the airbill was Saks' only instruction 
relating to the delivery of the furs. It cannot be said that 
that instruction alone was sufficient to make Airborne an 
agent of Saks. The defendant contends, however, that the 
contract between the shipper and United controls the rela· 
tionship between the shipper and itself on the ground that 
United was a "mere forwarder" of the goods to the defendant 
who then became the "agent" of the shipper, performing the 
delivery service subject to the terms of the airbill. (Of. 
9 Am.Jur., Carriers, § 889.) The defendant relies upon 
Oavallaro v. Texas &- Pac. Ry. 00., 110 Cal. 348 [42 P. 918, 
52 Am.St.Rep. 94]. In that case, this court held a subse· 
quent or connecting carrier liable to the shipper for mis· 
delivery of goods. In so holding, it was stated that the theory 
upon which the shipper's action was predicated was that the 
connecting carrier was the agent of the shipper to forward' 
or deliver the goods and was therefore liable to the shipper 
for its default or misfeasance. An agency relatiom:hip be· 
tween the shipper and the connecting carrier was used to ex· 
plain the theory of the action and to distinguish a line of 
English cases to the contrary. In Muschamp v. Lancaster 
etc. Ry. 00., 8 Mees. & W. 421, it was held that a shipper 
could recover against the first carrier for loss of goods by a 
) 
) 
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subsequent carrier. As a corollary to the Muschamp case, 
the English courts held that the shipper could not recover 
against a connecting carrier because there was no "privity 
of contract" between the shipper and the connecting carrier. 
(Hutchinson on Carriers. 3d ed., §§ 228,229.) The Cavallaro 
case states the theory upon which the "privity of contract" 
limitation was abandoned, giving the shipper a cause of action 
against the connecting carrier for loss of or damage to his 
goods, but it does not require the incorporation into every 
contract for the carriage of goods by a connecting carrier, 
the provisions of the original bill of lading without con-
sideration of all of its terms and the circumstances under 
which the parties contracted. 
The defendant contends that the airbill was a through bill 
of lading and that Airborne was entitled to its benefits. It 
relies upon a statement in 9 American Jurisprudence, Carriers, 
section 388, which defines a through bill of lading as ". . . 
one whereby the carrier agrees to transport the goods from 
the point of delivery to a designated point of destination, 
although such transportation extends over the line of a con-
necting carrier." If the airbill were a through bill it may 
well be that its provisions including the limitation of lia-
bility would inure to Airborne. 
[4] The trial court further found and concluded that the 
contract of carriage between Saks and United did not require 
United to deliver the shipment to its destination in San 
Francisco. The evidence amply supports this conclusion. 
United's tariff did not provide for delivery by it of goods 
carried on intrastate flights. The shipment was accepted 
by United subject to that tariff. The airbill shows a charge 
by United for air transportation only. No charge was made by 
United for ground delivery. Upon the arrival of the ship· 
ment at the San Francisco airport Airborne received it, 
weighed it, and determined the applicable rate for its trans-
portation to San Francisco. Saks paid United for trans-
portation of the furs to the San Francisco airport. Airborne 
billed Saks directly and a separate charge for Airborne's ser-
vices was paid by Saks to Airborne. 
[5] It does not appear that the understatement by Saks 
of the value of the furs had any legal relationship to the lia· 
bility of Airborne. Its freight charges were computed by 
reference to weight alone and the undervaluation of the furs 
could not, therefore, have affected that rate. 
The record supports the findings of the trial court and 
) 
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justifies the conclusion that there was no basis for the limita-
tion of the defendant's liability to Saks or through Saks to 
the plaintiff. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Carter, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The crucial document in this case is the airbilI delivered 
by Saks' agent to United at the Los Angeles Airport. The 
consignee of the goods was Saks' San Francisco store. The 
airbill provided that, "Delivery will be made to the con-
signee at points where delivery service is available unless 
otherwise specified below." Saks' agent did not specify other-
wise. Instead, he circled the word "delivery," inserted the 
street address of the San Francisco store, and under the 
printed words "instructions to carrier," wrote "PIs. A. M. 
Delivery. " 
From this evidence it is obvious, and counsel for plaintiff 
conceded in oral argument before this court, that Saks con-
templated that the goods would be delivered to its San Fran-
cisco store, not left at the San Francisco Airport. Saks knew 
that United had no surface delivery service, and could not 
carry the goods to the San Francisco store itself. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that Saks and United understood 
that when the goods arrived at the San Francisco Airport, 
United would obtain a carrier to take the goods to the store. 
On behalf of Saks, and as authorized by Saks, United entered 
into a contract with defendant for the delivery of the goods 
to their contemplated destination. 
What were the terms of that contract f The evidence shows 
without conflict that the airbiIl placed in the hands of United 
and passed on to the surface carrier was the only instruction 
from Saks. It was the voice of Saks in the negotiations with 
defendant. When defendant's agent accepted the goods, he 
receipted the airbill and took a copy of it. Defendant reason·· 
ably concluded that the value declared in the airbilI was 
the value Saks was willing to place on the goods throughout 
their carriage to the San Francisco store. Saks should not 
now be allowed to claim that it meant otherwise than its own 
actions reasonably indicated. 
I would modify the judgment by reducing it to $50 and 
affirm it as so modified. 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
